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Abstract
We show that white box adversarial examples do
not transfer effectively between convex and 01
loss and between 01 loss models compared to be-
tween convex models. We also show that convex
substitute model black box attacks are less effec-
tive on 01 loss than convex models, and that 01
loss substitute model attacks are ineffective on
both convex and 01 loss models. We show intu-
itively by example how the presence of outliers
can cause different decision boundaries between
01 and convex loss models which in turn produces
adversaries that are non-transferable. Indeed we
see on MNIST that adversaries transfer between
01 loss and convex models more easily than on CI-
FAR10 and ImageNet which are likely to contain
outliers. We also show intuitively by example how
the non-continuity of 01 loss makes adversaries
non-transferable in a two layer neural network.
1. Introduction
State of the art machine learning algorithms can achieve
high accuracies in classification tasks but misclassify minor
perturbations in the data known as as adversarial attacks
(Goodfellow et al., 2014; Papernot et al., 2016b; Kurakin
et al., 2016; Carlini & Wagner, 2017; Brendel et al., 2017).
Data corruptions that go beyond adversarial perturbations
such as image brightness, contrast, fog, and snow for ex-
ample also pose a challenge to machine learning methods
(Hendrycks & Dietterich, 2019).
The 01 loss is known to be robust to outliers (Bartlett et al.,
2004) and to label noise in the training data (Manwani &
Sastry, 2013; Ghosh et al., 2015). Does robustness of 01
loss also extend to adversarial data? We study this in the
setting of white box and substitute model black box attacks.
Computationally 01 loss presents a considerable challenge
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because it is NP-hard to solve (Ben-David et al., 2003). Pre-
vious attempts (Zhai et al., 2013; Tang et al., 2014; Shalev-
Shwartz et al., 2011; Li & Lin, 2007; Nguyen & Sanner,
2013) lack on-par test accuracy with convex solvers and
are slow and impractical for large multiclass image bench-
marks, except for the recent stochastic coordinate descent
(Xie et al., 2019)
We propose a two layer neural network with sign activation
(01) loss, which to the best of our knowledge is the first
such network to be proposed. We train it with stochastic
coordinate descent and show that it achieves on-par test
accuracy to equivalent convex models. We then proceed
with white box and substitute model black box attacks on
image benchmarks MNIST (LeCun et al., 1998), CIFAR10
(Krizhevsky, 2009), and Mini ImageNet (a ten class subset
of the original ImageNet (Russakovsky et al., 2015)) where
we make interesting findings.
2. Results
We refer to our linear (no hidden layer) and non-linear
(single hidden layer with 20 nodes) models as SCD01
and MLP01 respectively. See our Supplementary Mate-
rial for their objectives, optimization algorithms, and run-
time and accuracies on image classification benchmarks.
As convex counterparts we select the linear support vec-
tor machine (with a cross-validated regularization param-
eter) denoted as SVM and a two layer 20 hidden node
neural network with logistic loss (MLP). For multiclass
we use one-vs-all for all four methods. We use the ma-
jority vote of 32 runs for our 01 loss models to improve
stability and do the same for SVM and MLP by major-
ity voting on 32 bootstrapped samples. Our implementa-
tions and experimental platforms are given in detail in the
Supplementary Material. Our SCD01 and MLP01 source
codes, supplementary programs, and data are available from
https://github.com/zero-one-loss/mlp01.
We refer to the accuracy on the test data as clean data
test accuracy. An incorrectly classified adversarial exam-
ple is considered a successful attack whereas a correctly
classified adversarial is a failed one. Thus when we re-
fer to accuracy of adversarial examples it is the same as
100−attacksuccessrate. The lower the accuracy the more
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effective the attack.
2.1. White box attacks
In this section we study white box attacks just for bi-
nary classification on classes 0 and 1 in each of the three
datasets. We use single runs of each of the four models
to generate adversaries using the model parameters. We
use the same white box attack method (Papernot et al.,
2016a) for SVM and SCD01 since both are linear clas-
sifiers: for a given datapoint x and its label y the ad-
versary is x′ = x + (−y)sign(w) where sign(w) =
(sign(w1), sign(w2), ..., sign(wd)) and  is the distortion.
For MLP we use the fast gradient sign method (FGSM)
(Goodfellow et al., 2014). In this method we generate an
adversary using the sign of the model gradient xadv =
x + sign(∇xf(x, y) where f is the model objective and
∇xf(x, y) is the model gradient with respect to the data
x. We generate white box adversaries for MLP01 with a
simple heuristic: for each hidden node wk we modify the
input as x′ = x+(−y′)sign(wk) (where y′ = sign(wTk x)
is the output of x from the hidden node wk) and accept
the first modification that misclassifies x in the final node
output. If x is already misclassified or if none of the hidden
node distortions misclassify it we distort with a randomly
selected hidden node. We provide the full algorithm in
the Supplementary Material. We use  values on MNIST,
CIFAR10, and ImageNet that are typical in the literature.
In Table 1 we see that the clean accuracies of our 01 loss
models are comparable to the convex counterparts (with
more shown in the Supplementary Material). As expected
adversaries from the source on the same target are effective
except for MLP01. More interestingly, while adversaries
from SVM and MLP affect each other considerably they
are far less pronounced on SCD01 and MLP01. We see
this very clearly on CIFAR10 where both SVM and MLP
adversaries have almost 0% accuracy when attacking each
other indicating high transferability (Papernot et al., 2016a).
But SVM and MLP adversaries on SCD01 and MLP01 have
a far less effect in this dataset. Adversaries from MLP attain
a 63.7% accuracy on MLP01 and 43.5% on SCD01. Another
interesting observation is that adversaries barely transfer
between SCD01 and MLP01. We see similar behavior on
Mini ImageNet and to a lesser degree on MNIST.
We argue that the difference of loss functions (01 vs con-
vex) may be responsible for different boundaries and non-
transferability. We illustrate this in two examples. First we
see the effect of outliers on 01 loss and hinge loss linear
classifiers. Recall that the hinge loss is max(0, 1− ywTx)
where y is the label and wTx is the prediction of x given
by the classifier w. In Figure 1(a) the misclassified outlier
forces the hinge loss to give a skewed linear boundary with
two misclassifications. This happens because even though
Table 1. Accuracy of adversaries made by the source model shown
in the first column targeting models shown in the top row. We
consider only binary classification here between classes 0 and 1.
SVM SCD01 MLP MLP01
MNIST  = .3
Clean 100 99.9 100 100
SVM 11.9 8.1 40.4 43.5
SCD01 97 0 98.5 53.2
MLP 25.5 16.1 31 42.3
MLP01 99.9 99.8 99.6 69.5
CIFAR10  = .0625
Clean 82.2 81.1 88.7 84.2
SVM 0 41.3 0.5 70.1
SCD01 76 0.8 86 84.5
MLP 0 43.5 0.4 63.7
MLP01 81.7 80 88.5 66.9
Mini ImageNet  = .0625
Clean 60.7 67.5 66.1 68.7
SVM 0 54.9 21.2 53.8
SCD01 58.6 1 65 60.3
MLP 0.5 42 21.6 52.3
MLP01 60.8 65.1 65.8 35.7
the two points are misclassified by the red boundary they
are closer to it than the single misclassified one is to the blue
one. The 01 loss is unaffected by distances and thus gives
the blue boundary with one misclassification. Since the two
boundaries have different orientations their adversaries are
also likely to be different. In a dataset like MNIST where
our accuracies are high we don’t expect many misclassified
outliers and thus boundaries are unlikely to be different.
As a result we see that many adversaries transfer between
SVM and SCD01 on MNIST. But on CIFAR10 and Mini
ImageNet, which are more complex and likely to contain
misclassified outliers, we expect different boundaries which
in turn gives fewer adversaries that transfer between the
two.
Next we see the difference of convex and 01 loss in simple
two hidden node network. In Figure 1(b) we see two hyper-
planes u and v on the left whose logistic outputs give the
hidden feature space on the right. The two hyperplanes u
and v represent two hidden nodes in a two layer network.
Recall that the logistic activation 1
1+e−wT x
(where wTx is
prediction of x given by w) is similar to 01 loss: for large
values of |wTx| it approaches 0 or 1 depending upon the
sign ofwTx and approaches 12 as |wTx| approaches 0. Thus
if we move the red circle towards the ”corner” in the origi-
nal feature space (as shown in Figure 1(b)) its outputs from
u and v approach 12 in the hidden space. Consequently it
crosses the linear boundary in the hidden space and becomes
adversarial. However if the activation is 01 loss the red point
remains unmoved in the hidden space. In fact in 01 loss a
datapoint’s value in the hidden space changes only if we
cross a boundary in the original space.
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While both examples are not formal proofs they give some
intuition of why fewer adversarial examples transfer be-
tween 01 loss and convex loss compared to between just
convex. In particular we see that for 01 loss a datapoint
becomes potentially adversarial if and only if it crosses a
boundary in the original feature space whereas this is not
true for convex losses.
Red line=hinge
Blue line=01 loss
       label=-1
       label=+1
A
B
(a) Just one point B is misclassified by the blue boundary but its
hinge loss max(0, 1− ywTx) shown with dotted lines is much
higher than the loss of points A and B that are misclassified by
the red boundary. Thus the hinge loss favors the red skewed line.
u
v
u
v
1/2 1
1
1/2
Original feature space Hidden feature space
      label=0
      label=1
(b) The logistic activation 1
1+e−wT x
in the original space gives
a linear separation in the hidden space. If we move the red circle
towards the ”corner” of the boundaries its distance to u and v
decreases. This in turn makes its activation values approach half
and it becomes misclassified in the hidden space. If the activation
is 01 loss the red circle does not get affected in the hidden space.
Figure 1. Toy example showing different 01 loss and hinge bound-
aries, and adversarial examples in simple logistic loss network
Interestingly we also see MLP01 adversaries don’t transfer
to the other three models. When applied to MLP01 the
adversaries lower its accuracy relative to clean data but to
lesser degree than other models attacking themselves. Thus
our white box attack method for MLP01 may not be the
most powerful one leaving this an open problem.
2.2. Substitute model black box attacks
We see that white box adversaries don’t transfer between
convex and 01 loss but can we attack a 01 loss model with
a convex substitute model (Papernot et al., 2016a)? In this
subsection we consider binary and multiclass classification
on all three datasets. For all four methods we use 32 votes
and one-vs-all multiclass classification. We use adversar-
ial data augmentation (Papernot et al., 2016a) to iteratively
train a substitute model trained on label outputs from the
target model. In each epoch we generate white box adver-
saries targeting the substitute model with the FGSM method
(Goodfellow et al., 2014) and evaluate them on the target.
Note that our black box attack is untargeted, we are mainly
interested in misclassifying the data and not the misclas-
sification label. See Supplementary Material for the full
substitute model learning algorithms but it is essentially the
method of Papernot et. al. (Papernot et al., 2016a).
2.2.1. CONVEX SUBSTITUTE MODEL
In Figure 2 we see the accuracy of target models on adver-
saries generated from a convex substitute model. Specifi-
cally we use a dual hidden layer neural network with logistic
loss and 200 nodes in each hidden layer as the substitute
model. Like in the white box attacks we use  values com-
monly used on these datasets. In MNIST (Figure 2(a)) we
see a rapid drop in accuracy in the first few epochs and
somewhat flat after epoch 10. We don’t see a considerable
difference between the 01 loss and convex sibling models
on MNIST although MLP01 has the highest accuracy.
On CIFAR10 and Mini ImageNet we see much more pro-
nounced differences. In CIFAR10 binary classification (Fig-
ure 2(b)) we see that even though both MLP and MLP01
start off with clean test accuracies of 88% and 86% re-
spectively, at the end of the 20th epoch MLP01 has 58%
accuracy on adversarial examples while MLP has 7% ac-
curacy. We see similar results on Mini ImageNet binary
classification in the Supplementary Material. In CIFAR10
multiclass (Figure 2(c)) at the end of the 20th epoch the dif-
ference in accuracy between MLP and MLP01 is 24% even
though both methods start off with about the same accuracy
on clean test data. Similarly on Mini ImageNet MLP01 is
20.7% higher in accuracy than MLP in the 20th epoch. This
is particularly interesting since MLP01 started off with a
higher accuracy on Mini ImageNet and in general we expect
more accurate models to be less robust (Raghunathan et al.,
2019; Zhang et al., 2019; Tsipras et al., 2018). However that
is not the case here. Even if we give MLP the advantage
of 400 hidden nodes in a shared weight network instead of
one-vs-all, its accuracy in the 20th epoch is 13% lower than
MLP01.
We have already seen earlier in white box attacks that ad-
versaries transfer between SVM and SCD01 on MNIST but
not so much on CIFAR10 and Mini ImageNet. The same
phenomena can be used to explain the results we see here.
On MNIST the convex substitute model can attack SCD01
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(a) MNIST  = .2
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(b) CIFAR10 binary (class 0 and 1)  = .0625
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(b) CIFAR10  = .0625
Epochs
Ac
cu
ra
cy
 o
f a
dv
er
sa
ria
l e
xa
m
pl
es
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0 5 10 15 20
MLP01 MLP MLP400 SVM SCD01
(c) Mini ImageNet  = 0.0625
Figure 2. Multiclass untargeted black box attack with a dual 200
node hidden layer logistic loss network as the substitute model. In
epoch 0 are the clean test accuracies.
and MLP01 as effectively as convex models due to better
transferability on MNIST. Due to poor transferability on
CIFAR10 and Mini ImageNet we see that the attack is less
effective on SCD01 and MLP01. In the next subsection we
explore what happens if the substitute model is SCD01.
2.2.2. 01 LOSS SUBSTITUTE MODEL
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Figure 3. We use SCD01 single run as the substitute model to
attack single runs of the target models between only classes 0 and
1 in CIFAR10. In epoch 0 are the clean test accuracies.
In Figure 3 we see the results of a black box attack with
SCD01 single run as the substitute model attacking single
runs of target models. We see that adversaries produced
from this model hardly affect any of the target models in any
of the epochs. Even when the target is SCD01 and trained
with the same initial seed as the substitute the adversaries
are ineffective.
Further investigation reveals that the percentage of test data
whose labels match between the 01 loss substitute and its
target (known as the label match rate) is high but the label
match rate on adversarial examples is much lower (shown
in Supplementary Material). Thus even though the SCD01
manages to approximate the target boundary its direction
is different which gives ineffective adversaries. This is due
to the non-uniqueness of 01 loss which makes single run
solutions different from each other. Thus as a substitute
model in black box attacks 01 loss is ineffective even in
attacking itself.
3. Conclusion
There is nothing to indicate that 01 loss models are robust
to black box attacks that do not require substitute model
training (Brendel et al., 2017; Chen et al., 2019). These
are, however, computationally more expensive and require
separate computations for each example. A transfer based
model can be more effective (and dangerous) once it has
approximated the target model boundary.
Can we further decrease transferability by introducing arti-
ficial noise so that 01 loss and convex boundaries are even
more different, particularly on datasets like MNIST? We
explore this in a separate study.
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4. Supplementary Material
4.1. Background
The problem of determining the hyperplane with minimum
number of misclassifications in a binary classification prob-
lem is known to be NP-hard (Ben-David et al., 2003). In
mainstream machine learning literature this is called mini-
mizing the 01 loss (Shai et al., 2011) given in Objective 1,
1
2n
argmin
w,w0
∑
i
(1− sign(yi(wTxi + w0))) (1)
where w ∈ Rd, w0 ∈ R is our hyperplane, and xi ∈
Rd, yi ∈ {+1,−1}.∀i = 0...n − 1 are our training data.
Popular linear classifiers such as the linear support vec-
tor machine, perceptron, and logistic regression (Alpaydin,
2004) can be considered as convex approximations to this
problem that yield fast gradient descent solutions (Bartlett
et al., 2004). However, they are also more sensitive to out-
liers than the 01 loss (Bartlett et al., 2004; Nguyen & Sanner,
2013; Xie et al., 2019) and more prone to mislabeled data
than 01 loss (Manwani & Sastry, 2013; Ghosh et al., 2015;
Lyu & Tsang, 2019).
4.2. A two layer 01 loss neural network
We extend the 01 loss to a simple two layer neural network
with k hidden nodes and sign activation that we call the
MLP01 loss. This objective for binary classification can be
given as
1
2n
argmin
W,W0,w,w0
∑
i
(1−sign(yi(wT (sign(WTxi+W0))+w0)))
(2)
where W ∈ Rd×k, W0 ∈ Rk are the hidden layer
parameters, w ∈ Rk, w0 ∈ R are the final layer
node parameters, xi ∈ Rd, yi ∈ {+1,−1}.∀i =
0...n − 1 are our training data, and sign(v ∈ Rk) =
(sign(v0), sign(v1), ..., sign(vk−1)). While this is a
straightforward model to define optimizing it is a different
story altogether. Optimizing even a single node is NP-hard
which makes optimizing this network much harder.
4.3. Stochastic coordinate descent for 01 loss
We solve both problems with stochastic coordinate descent
based upon earlier work (Xie et al., 2019). We initialize all
parameters to random values from the Normal distribution
with mean 0 and variance 1. We then randomly select a
subset of the training data (known as a batch) and perform
the coordinate descent analog of a single step gradient up-
date in stochastic gradient descent (Bottou, 2010). We first
describe this for a linear 01 loss classifier which we obtain
if we set the number of hidden nodes to zero. In this case
the parameters to optimize are the final weight vector w and
the threshold w0.
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When the gradient is known we step in its negative direction
by a factor of the learning rate: w = w − η∇(f) where
f is the objective. In our case since the gradient does not
exist we randomly select k features (set to 64, 128, and 256
for MNIST, CIFAR10, and ImageNet in our experiments),
modify the corresponding entries in w by the learning rate
(set to 0.17) one at a time, and accept the modification that
gives the largest decrease in the objective. Key to our search
is a heuristic to determine the optimal threshold each time
we modify an entry of w. In this heuristic we perform a
linear search on a subset of the projection wTxi and select
w0 that minimizes the objective.
Figure S1. Train and test accuracy of our stochastic coordinate de-
scent on CIFAR10 class 0 vs 1 with different batch sizes (denoted
as nrows).
We repeat the above update step on randomly selected
batches for a specified number of iterations given by the
user. In Figure S1 we show the effect of the batch size (as a
percentage of each class to ensure fair sampling) on a linear
01 loss search on CIFAR10 between classes 0 and 1. We
see that a batch size of 75% reaches a train accuracy of 80%
faster than the other batch sizes. Thus we use this batch size
in all our experiments going forward.
We also see that for this batch size the search flattens after
15 iterations (or epochs as given in the figure). We run 1000
iterations to ensure a deep search with an intent to maximize
test accuracy. For imbalanced data (that appears in the one-
vs-all design) we find that optimizing a balanced version of
our objective for half the iterations followed by the default
(imbalanced) version gives a lower objective in the end.
In a two layer network we have to optimize our hidden
nodes as well. In each of the 1000 iterations of our search
we apply the same coordinate update described above, first
to the final output node and then a randomly selected hidden
node. In preliminary experiments we find this to be fast and
almost as effective as optimizing all hidden nodes and the
final node in each iteration.
Our intuition is that by searching on just the sampled data
we avoid local minima and across several iterations we can
explore a broad portion of the search space. Throughout
iterations we keep track of the best parameters that minimize
our objective on the full dataset. Below we provide full
details of our algorithms.
The problem with our search described above is that it will
return different solutions depending upon the initial starting
point. To make it more stable we run it 32 times from differ-
ent random seeds and use the majority vote for prediction.
We extend both our linear and non-linear models to a sim-
ple one-vs-all approach for multiclass classification. For a
dataset with k classes we create 32 one-vs-all classifiers for
each of the k classes. From the 32 models we can obtain
frequency outputs for a test point using simple counting and
use them as confidence scores for each class k. From this
we output the predicted class as the one with the highest
confidence. This is similar in spirit to the typical convex
softmax objective used in convex neural networks except
that there we can optimize to obtain the exact confidences
given by sigmoid probabilities.
4.4. Implementation, experimental platform, and
image benchmarks
We implement our 01 loss models in Python and Pytorch
(Paszke et al., 2019), and both MLP and SVM (LinearSVC
class) in scikit-learn (Pedregosa et al., 2011). We opti-
mize MLP with stochastic gradient descent that has a batch
size of 200, momentum of 0.9, and learning rate of 0.01
(.001 for ImageNet data). We ran all experiments on In-
tel Xeon 6142 2.6GHz CPUs and NVIDIA Titan RTX
GPU machines (for parallelizing multiple votes). Our
SCD01 and MLP01 source codes, supplementary programs,
and data are available from https://github.com/
zero-one-loss/mlp01.
We experiment on three popular image benchmarks: MNIST
(LeCun et al., 1998), CIFAR10 (Krizhevsky, 2009), and
ImageNet (Russakovsky et al., 2015). Briefly MNIST is
composed of grayscale handwritten digits each of size 28×
28 with 60000 training images and 10000 test and CIFAR10
has 32 × 32 color images with 50000 training and 10000
test. ImageNet is a large benchmark with 1000 classes and
color images of size 256× 256. We extract images from10
random classes and split them to give a training set of 6144
images and test set of 6369. We normalize each image in
each benchmark by dividing each pixel value by 255.
4.5. Clean accuracy and runtimes
Before going into robustness we first compare the clean
test data accuracies and training runtimes of our 01 loss
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models to their convex counterparts. In Table S1 we see
that ensembling SVM and MLP models does not improve
the test accuracy over single runs, thus we use a shared
weight MLP network with 400 nodes on ImageNet to boost
accuracy there. In fact the SVM boundary depends only
upon the support vectors and so each ensemble will be
the same as long as the support vectors are included. As
a reminder we ensemble by taking the majority vote on
multiple bootstrapped samples.
The 01 loss models improve considerably in all three
datasets by ensembling. This is not too surprising since
01 loss is non-unique and will give different solutions when
ran multiple times from different initializations. As a result
of ensembling their accuracy is comparable to their con-
vex peers. This makes it easier to compare their robustness
since we don’t have to worry about the robustness vs accu-
racy tradeoff (Raghunathan et al., 2019; Zhang et al., 2019;
Tsipras et al., 2018).
Table S1. Accuracy of our 01 loss and convex counterparts on
clean test data
Single run
SVM SCD01 MLP MLP01
MNIST 91.7 83.7 97.6 91.2
CIFAR10 39.9 30.7 50.2 34.3
Mini ImageNet 26 25 32 25.5
32 votes
SVM SCD01 MLP MLP01
MNIST 91.7 90.8 97.1 96
CIFAR10 40.2 39.7 47.4 46.4
MLP400 SCD01 MLP01
single run
Mini ImageNet 36 34.7 41
In Table S2 we show the runtime of a single run of our 01
loss and convex models on class 0 vs all for each of the three
datasets. We don’t claim the most optimized implementa-
tion but our runtimes are still somewhat comparable to the
convex loss models. Interestingly the convex models take
much longer on complex and higher dimensional images in
ImageNet compared to MNIST. Our 01 loss model runtimes
are similar on MNIST and CIFAR10 because their sizes
are similar. On Mini ImageNet since it has fewer training
samples than MNIST and CIFAR10 the 01 loss runtimes
are also lower.
Table S2. Runtimes in seconds of single runs of our 01 loss and
convex counterparts on class 0 vs all. On Mini ImageNet we show
runtimes for MLP with 400 nodes in its hidden layer since 20
nodes has much lower accuracy.
SVM SCD01 MLP MLP01
MNIST 0.8 171 64 875
CIFAR10 80 150 267 838
Mini ImageNet 659 83 8564 199
4.6. Label match rates between SCD01 substitute
model and target models in black box attack
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(a) Percentage of labels that are the same between
the substitute model and target model on clean data
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(b) Percentage of labels that are the same between
the substitute model and target model on adversarial data
Figure S2. In (a) we see that SCD01 as a substitute model can
approximate the target boundary as shown in the label match rate
between SCD01 and the target. But when we use the SCD01 to
generate adversaries the match rate is much lower which indicates
that the direction of the SCD01 boundary is very different from the
targets and thus its adversaries have very little effect on the target.
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4.7. Black box adversarial attacks on class 0 and 1 on
Mini-ImageNet with convex substitute model
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(a) Black box attack on classes 0 and 1 on Mini-ImageNet
with convex substitute model and distortion  = 0.0625
Figure S3. Our 01 loss model are robust to convex substitute black
box attacks also in binary classification. Here we see that the accu-
racies on clean test data are higher than multiclass classification
and yet our models are still robust.
4.8. Coordinate descent
Algorithm 1 Coordinate descent
Input: Data (feature vectors) xi ∈ Rd for i = 0..n−1 with
labels yi ∈ {+1,−1}, winc ∈ R, size of pooled features to
update k, vector w ∈ Rd and w0 ∈ R
Output: Vector w ∈ Rd and w0 ∈ R
Procedure:
1. Initialization: If w is null then let each feature wi
of w be normally drawn from N(0, 1). We set ‖w‖ =
1 and throughout our search ensure that ‖w‖ = 1 by
renormalizing each time w changes.
2. Let the number of misclassified points with negative
wTxi be errorminus = 0 and those with positive wTxi
be errorplus = 0. These are later used in the Opti-
mal Threshold algorithm called Opt (see below) for fast
update of our objective.
3. Compute the initial data projection wTxi,∀i = 0..n−
1, sort the projection with insertion sort, and initialize
(w0, obj) = Opt(w
Tx, y, 0, n − 1). We also record the
value of j for the optimal w0 = (wTxj + wTxj+1)/2.
4. Set prevobj =∞, done = 0.
while done != 1 do
Set prevobj = obj
Randomly pick k of the d feature indices.
for all selected features wi we update them do
1. Assume the optimal w0 = (wTxj +wTxj+1)/2
2. Set start = wTxj−10 and end = wTxj+10
3. Modify coordinate wi by winc, compute data pro-
jection wTxi∀i = 0..n− 1, and sort the projection
with insertion sort
4. Set (w0, obj) = Opt(wTx, y, start, end) and
record this value for feature wi
5. Reset w0 to try the next coordinate
end for
Pick the coordinate whose update gives the largest
decrease in the objective and set (w0, obj) to the values
given by the best coordinate with ties decided randomly.
Set done = 1
end while
This is our core coordinate descent algorithm. We perform
just one iterative update instead of convergence. We find
this to be more accurate and faster.
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4.9. Optimal threshold w0 and 01 loss objective value
Algorithm 2 Opt
Input: wTxi ∈ Rd for i = 0..n − 1 with labels yi ∈
{+1,−1}, start, end
Output: Optimal w0 ∈ R with minimum (balanced) 01
loss and the loss value obj
Procedure:
1: for i = start to end− 1 do
2: w′0 =
wT xi+w
T xi+1
2
3: if yi(wTxi + w′0) == 0 then
4: If yi == 1 then errorplus++
5: else if yi(wTxi + w′0) > 0 then
6: If yi == 1 then errorplus−− else errorminus−−
7: else if yi(wTxi + w′0) < 0 then
8: If yi == 1 then errorplus++ else errorminus++
9: end if
10: If obj′ = errorplus+errorminusn is lower than current
best objective obj then obj = obj′ and w0 = w′0.
11: end for
12: return (w0, obj)
This is our fast algorithm to update w0 and the model objec-
tive. Once we have the objective for w0 =
wT xi+w
T xi+1
2
we can calculate it for w0 =
wT xi+1+w
T xi+2
2 in constant
time.
4.10. Stochastic coordinate descent for linear 01 loss
Algorithm 3 Stochastic coordinate descent for linear 01
loss
Input: Data (feature vectors) xi ∈ Rd with labels yi ∈
{+1,−1}, number of votes rr ∈ N (Natural numbers),
number of iterations per votet it ∈ N (Natural numbers),
batch size as a percent of training data p ∈ [0, 1], andwinc ∈
R
Output: Total of rr pairs of (bestw ∈ Rd, bestw0 ∈ R)
after each vote
Procedure:
Set j = 0
while j < rr do
1. Set bestw = null, bestw0 = null, bestloss =∞
for i = 0 to it do
1. Randomly pick p percent of rows as input training
data to the coordinate descent algorithm and run
it to completion starting with the values of w and
w0 from the previous call to it (if i == 0 we set
w = null, w0 = null).
2. In the next step we calculate the linear 01 loss
objective on the full input training set
if objective(w,w0) < objective(bestw, bestw0)
then
Set bestw = w, bestw0 = w0, and bestloss =
objective(w,w0)
end if
end for
2. Output bestw and bestw0
3. Set j = j + 1.
end while
We output all (bestw, bestw0) pairs across the votes. We
can use the pair with the lowest objective or the majority
vote of all pairs for prediction.
Our stochastic descent search performs coordinate descent
for the model parameters w,w0. We keep track of the best
parameters across iterations by evaluating the model objec-
tive on the full dataset after each iteration.
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4.11. Stochastic coordinate descent for two layer 01
loss network
Algorithm 4 Stochastic coordinate descent for two layer 01
loss network
Input: Data (feature vectors) xi ∈ Rd with labels yi ∈
{+1,−1}, number of hidden nodes h, number of votes
rr ∈ N (Natural numbers), number of iterations per vote
it ∈ N , batch size as a percent of training data p ∈ [0, 1],
winc ∈ R and winc2 ∈ R
Output: Total of rr sets of (bestW ∈ Rk×d, bestW0 ∈
Rk, bestw ∈ Rk, bestw0 ∈ R) after each vote
Procedure:
1. Initialize all network weights W,w to random values
from the Normal distribution N(0, 1).
2. Set network thresholds W0 to the median projection
value on their corresponding weight vectors and w0 to the
projection value that minimizes our network objective.
while j < rr do
Set bestW = null, bestW0 = null, bestw =
null, bestw0 = null, bestloss =∞
for i = 0 to it do
Randomly pick p percent of rows as input training
data.
Run the Coordinate Descent Algorithm 1 on the final
output node w to completion starting with the values
of w and w0 from the previous call to it (if i == 0
we set w = null). We use learning rate winc2 in the
coordinate descent.
Run the Coordinate Descent Algorithm 1 on a ran-
domly selected hidden node wk (kth column in W )
starting with the values of wk and wk0 (kth entry
in W0) from the previous call to it (if i == 0 we
set wk = null). We use learning rate winc in the
coordinate descent for the hidden nodes.
Calculate the two layer network 01 loss objective on
the full input training set
if objective(W,W0, w, w0) <
objective(bestW, bestW0, bestw, bestw0) then
Set bestW = W , bestW0 = W0,
bestw = w, bestw0 = w0, and bestloss =
objective(bestW, bestW0, bestw, bestw0)
end if
end for
Output (bestW , bestW0, bestw, bestw0)
Set j = j + 1.
end while
We output all sets of (bestW, bestW0, bestw, bestw0)
across the votes. We can use the first set or the majority
vote of all sets for predictions.
Our stochastic descent search performs coordinate descent
on the final node and then a random hidden node in each
iteration. We keep track of the best parameters across itera-
tions by evaluating the model objective on the full dataset
after each iteration.
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4.12. White box adversarial attacks
Algorithm 5 White box adversaries for MLP01
Input: MLP01 model vector weights W ∈ Rk×d,W0 ∈
Rk, w ∈ Rk, w0 ∈ R, feature vector x ∈ Rd and label
y ∈ {+1,−1}
Output: Adversarial feature vector x′ ∈ Rd
Procedure:
for each hidden node wk ∈ W (each row of W in a
random order) do
Evaluate output of x from the hidden node wk as y′ =
sign(wTk x+ wk0)
Make x adversarial w.r.t. the boundary wk with x′ =
x+ (−y′)sign(wk).
Evaluate model output of x′ as y′′ =
wT (sign(WTx′ +W0)) + w0
if y not equal to y” then
Accept adversarial example x′ and exit loop
end if
end for
if no adversarial example found then
Evaluate output of x from the first hidden node w1 as
y′ = sign(wT1 x+ w10)
Set x′ = x+ (−y′)sign(w1)
end if
If the datapoint x is already misclassified by our model our
attack simply performs the perturbation given by a random
hidden node w1 (since the ordering is chosen randomly).
Otherwise it picks the distortion of the first random node
wk that makes it misclassified. If no distortion misclassifies
the point it distorts the datapoint by the first hidden node w1
in the random ordering.
4.13. Black box adversarial attacks
Algorithm 6 Substitute model training with augmented ad-
versaries
Input: Model M to be attacked, adversarial attacker B, λ
and  that determine amount of adversarial perturbation in
each sample where λ is used in training the substitute model
and  is to generate adversaries to attack the target model,
dataset xi ∈ Rd with labels yi ∈ {+1,−1} (for 10 classes
we have {0, 1, ..., 9}), number of epochs ep ∈ N (Natural
numbers)
Procedure:
Set the initial data D = {xi} as 200 random samples
from the input dataset.
for i = 0 to ep do
1. Obtain predictions y′i of D from black box model
M
3. Train attacker B with D as input training data
4. With B’s gradient we produce adversarial examples
as augmented data to train the substitute with the step
below.
5. For each sample xi in D create adversary x′i =
xi ± λsign(∇fx(x, y′)) where ∇f is the gradient of
B with respect to the data x and λ is given in the input.
We randomly decide to add or subtract λ by a coin flip
and found this trick to improve the substitute model
accuracy on the input data and produce more effective
adversarial examples.
6. We have the optional step of generating adver-
saries with the trained substitute model and evaluating
their accuracy on the target. In this way we can see
the adversarial accuracy of the target models across
epochs as we train the substitute. We use the same
method described below: generate adversaries on the
input dataset minus the 200 samples with the formula
x′ = x+ sign(∇fx(x, y)) and  set to the 0.0625 for
CIFAR10 and ImageNet and 0.3 for MNIST.
7. Add new adversarial samples {x′i} to D. This
doubles the number of adversarial samples after each
iteration until we reach 6400. After this we just replace
the adversarial examples from the previous epoch with
the new one.
end for
Now that our attacked B is trained we produced ad-
versaries for the remaining datapoints. For each data-
point x in the dataset minus the 200 selected initially
to train the substitute we produce adversaries using
x′ = x + sign(∇fx(x, y)) as in step 5 above but now
we use  instead of λ. We now test the accuracy of the
target model M with the newly generated adversaries.
Note that this is an untargeted attacked. We just want the
datapoint to be misclassified by the model, we don’t care
which class it is misclassified into.
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In the above procedure we use the test data as the input
when attacking a model on a benchmark. We set λ = 0.1
for MNIST and CIFAR10 and λ = 0.01 for ImageNet since
these values produce the most effective attack. We use 
values on MNIST, CIFAR10, and ImageNet that are typical
in the literature. For MNIST  = .3 corresponds to a change
of 255 × .3 = 76.5 in each pixel and for CIFAR10 and
ImageNet  = .0625 corresponds to a change of 255 ×
.0625 = 16 in each pixel.
When our substitute model is the dual layer network each
with 200 hidden nodes we train it with stochastic gradient
descent, batch size of 200, learning rate of 0.01, and mo-
mentum of 0.9. When it is SCD01 we run 1000 iterations
with batch size (nrows) of 75%.
